Non-linear pricing by convex duality by Pinar, M.C.




Non-linear pricing by convex duality✩
Mustafa Ç. Pınar
Department of Industrial Engineering, Bilkent University, 06800 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 26 June 2014
Received in revised form
11 November 2014
Accepted 8 January 2015







a b s t r a c t
We consider the pricing problem of a risk-neutral monopolist who produces (at a cost) and offers an in-
finitely divisible good to a single potential buyer that can be of a finite number of (single dimensional)
types. The buyer has a non-linear utility function that is differentiable, strictly concave and strictly in-
creasing. Using a simple reformulation and shortest path problem duality as in Vohra (2011) we trans-
form the initial non-convex pricing problem of the monopolist into an equivalent optimization problem
yielding a closed-form pricing formula under a regularity assumption on the probability distribution of
buyer types.We examine the solution of the problemwhen the regularity condition is relaxed in different
ways, or when the production function is non-linear and convex. For arbitrary type distributions, we offer
a complete solution procedure.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. The setting
Non-linear pricing is a basic problem of economic mechanism
design under asymmetric information. Consider amonopolist who
is producing an infinitely divisible good, e.g., sugar, and wishes
to sell the good to a potential buyer with unknown valuation for
his/her product. The seller’s production function is assumed to be
linear with a slope equal to c > 0. The seller is risk neutral, and
therefore, seeks to maximize the expected revenue from the sale.
The buyer can be one of a finite number of types t from the index
setT = {1, . . . ,m}withm > 2. The parameter t for the type of the
buyer is assumed to represent the valuation of a potential buyer for
the good. The buyer derives a utility equal to t · u(At) − pt from
acquisition of a quantity At (allocation to buyer of type t) of the
good, where u is a differentiable, strictly concave, strictly increas-
ing function (u′′(x) < 0, u′(x) > 0 for every x) with u(0) = 0 and
a strictly decreasing (u′)−1, and pt is the price paid for acquisition
of the quantity At ≥ 0. The crux of the problem is that a potential
buyer’s type (or valuation of the good) t is private, i.e., unknown to
the seller. However, the seller’s beliefs about t are given by a prob-
ability mass function f on the discrete set T . The problem of the
seller is to devise a mechanism that will maximize expected rev-
enue while it elicits a truthful declaration of type by the seller and
ensures his/her participation.
✩ The material in this paper was not presented at any conference. This paper was
recommended for publication in revised form by Associate Editor Oswaldo Luiz V.
Costa under the direction of Editor Berç Rüstem.
E-mail address:mustafap@bilkent.edu.tr.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2015.01.027
0005-1098/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The non-linear pricing problem briefly described above occurs
in many industries, e.g., wireless communication services, other
telecom and technology products, legal plans, fitness clubs, auto-
mobile clubs and healthcare plans; see Bagh and Bhargava (2013)
for further details. It is part of the general theory of basic static ad-
verse selection problems in economics. The study of the problem
was started inMirrlees (1971) and developed into amature subject
with numerous contributions (a notable one is the paper by Myer-
son, 1981) that would be impractical to cite in this short note. An
authoritative and detailed reference on nonlinear pricing is Wil-
son (1997).1 As it is closer to our treatment, we adopt as our desk-
top reference on non-linear pricing of a single good the book by
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) which contains a list of the main
references on the subject up to 2005. One can find in Chapter 2 of
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) discussions of the non-linear pric-
ing problem first with two types, and then with a finite number of
different types and then, a continuum of types using methods that
are different from that of the present note. In fact, the Ref. Bolton
and Dewatripont (2004) does not offer an explicit solution for the
case of discrete types while (nor does Wilson, 1997 for that mat-
ter) for a continuum of types a closed-form pricing formula (cred-
ited to Baron & Myerson, 1982 and Maskin & Riley, 1984) is given
under a condition on the utility function and the monotonicity as-
sumption on the probability distribution of types.When themono-
tonicity assumption is violated, a so-called ironing procedure gives
the optimal contractwith a bunching/pooling property (the optimal
1 Our utility model differs from that of Wilson where the dependence of buyer
utility on type is not made explicit.
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ods of calculus of variations. Other noteworthy references include
Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Figueroa and Skreta (2007), Gues-
nerie and Seade (1982), Matthews and Moore (1987) and Moore
(1984). In Figueroa and Skreta (2007), the auction ofmultiple goods
is considered for the case of a continuum of types where prefer-
ences are represented by a non-linear utility function. It is shown
that when incentive compatibility constraints bind, a randomized
mechanismmay be optimal as opposed to the deterministic mech-
anisms considered in the present paper. An interesting application
of non-linear pricing where monotonicity assumption may be vio-
lated is reported in Crawford and Shum (2007) where the authors
explore the degree of quality degradation in cable television mar-
kets and the impact of regulation on those choices using empirical
data from cable networks. Taking the utility function of consumers
to be linear in quality, they utilize two, three or four types of
consumers in the model of monopoly choice of Mussa and Rosen
(1978) which addresses the problem of a monopolist selling two
goods whose qualities varies over a finite interval to consumers
that are differentiated by a parameter that can take distinct values
where the first type represents consumers who prefer not to pur-
chase any of the cable network products. The empirical consumer
type distributions derived from market share data may indeed vi-
olate monotonicity (cf. Table 5, p. 201 of Crawford & Shum, 2007).
Against this background, the purpose of the present note is to
derive a simple explicit price formula for the case of discrete types
using the machinery of convex optimization and duality as advo-
cated by Vohra (2011, 2012) although themechanism design prob-
lem is initially formulated as a non-convex optimization problem.
The contribution of the manuscript is to bring to bear the novel
analysis technique based on convex duality of Vohra on instances
where regularity of the types distribution is violated. The main
results are the discrete-types analogs of the continuous types re-
sults of the literature. Our first result is obtained under a regularity
(monotonicity) assumption of the probability mass f as in Bolton
and Dewatripont (2004). The result extends in a straightforward
manner to the case of convex production cost function of the mo-
nopolist. Then, we relax gradually the regularity assumption and
prove further results for the optimal mechanism which mimics
the ironing/bunching(pooling) solution of the continuous types case.
To the best of our knowledge, the present note is one of the few
papers that addresses the discrete (single dimensional) multiple
types (more than two types) non-linear pricing problem from a
mathematical programming perspective alongwith e.g., Bandi and
Bertsimas (2012) and Vohra (2012). This short note may also serve
as an entry point for newcomers to the subject as it treats a simpler
setting and uses rather basic tools of optimization, compared to
e.g., Vohra (2012)which involves optimization over poly-matroids.
An important feature of our paper is that any instance of the non-
linear pricing problemdescribed in the present paper can be solved
explicitly without resorting to a non-linear optimization software.
We illustrate our results with examples.
By virtue of the Revelation Principle (Vohra, 2011), the seller is
interested in designing a directmechanism that consists of the two
discrete functions p (for price) and A (for allocation), both func-
tions of type t . In other words, the seller implementing a direct
mechanismdeclares a price pt and a quantity allocationAt for each
type t . Against this background, the problem of pricing the indivis-
ible good is formulated as the following optimization problem.We
define the decision variables pt for all t ∈ T for the price quoted
by the seller to a buyer of type t , in addition to the non-negative al-
location variables At . The seller wishes to maximize the expected
profits from the sale:
m
t=1
ft(pt − cAt) (1)under the restrictions of Incentive Compatibility (IC) and Individ-
ual Rationality (IR) that are, respectively:
t(u(At) − u(As)) ≥ pt − ps, ∀t, s ∈ T (2)
t · u(At) − pt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T . (3)
The constraint (IC) ensures that the utility of the seller that declares
his/her type truthfully is at least as large as the utility derived from
reporting a different type. The constraint (IR) is to ensure that the
minimum (reservation) utility of any buyer of any type is at least
zero, which leads to ensuring participation of the buyers into the
mechanism.
Therefore, the seller seeks a pair pt , At ≥ 0 for each type t ∈ T
that maximizes (1) under the restrictions (2)–(3). Note that the
problem (1)–(2)–(3) is in general non-convex due to the presence
of the difference u(At) − u(As) which is not necessarily a concave
function. In the next section we prove a simple result departing
from hidden convex (more precisely, concave since we are maxi-
mizing) structure in the problem.
2. The optimal mechanism under monotonicity
Let νt = t − 1−Ftft for all t ∈ T where we denote by F the cu-
mulative distribution function associated with the mass function
f (νt is commonly referred to as the virtual valuation). The eco-
nomic meaning attached to the virtual valuation of the bidder is
the marginal revenue obtained by allocating the item to this bid-
der. As is common to most references, see e.g., Bolton and Dewa-
tripont (2004), Tirole (1990) and the references therein,we assume
νt to be monotone increasing in t . We call f regular if them-vector
ν associated with f is monotone increasing.2 A way to enforce the
above monotonicity is the so-called Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR)
condition. A distribution F with density f is said to satisfy theMHR
condition if the hazard rate f (t)1−F(t) is non-increasing with t . Most
well-known continuous distributions satisfy the MHR condition,
e.g., the uniform, the normal, the Pareto, the logistic, the exponen-
tial; see Section 3.5 of Tirole (1990). Therefore, one may safely as-
sume that it will hold for their discretized counterparts.
The first result of the note is the following.
Proposition 1. For regular f there exists an optimal direct mecha-








and the optimal prices






for all t = t∗, . . . , T where t∗ is the smallest value of t that satisfies:
ν(t∗) > 0, and A∗t = p
∗
t = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , t
∗
− 1.
Proof. We can always define a dummy type t = 0 with A0 =
p0 = 0 and incorporate constraint (3) into (2); see Vohra (2011).








t(yt − ys) ≥ pt − ps, ∀t, s ∈ T
u(At) ≥ yt , ∀t ∈ T .
2 In fact, it is sufficient that the positive components of ν are monotone
increasing.
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problem is equivalent to (1)–(2)–(3) with the property that at an
optimum solution one has yt = u(At) for all t ∈ T . Now using the
development in Vohra (2011) we have that for fixed yt , t ∈ T , the
inequalities for incentive compatibility
t(yt − ys) ≥ pt − ps, ∀t, s ∈ T
hold for some pt , t ∈ T if and only if yt is monotone non-
decreasing in t by the theory of duality applied to the shortest path
problem; see Chapters 3 and4of Vohra (2011) for an in-depth anal-
ysis of shortest path duality.3 Furthermore, at optimality one has




Thus, replacing pt by tyt −
t−1
j=1 yj in the objective function, af-
ter some simple algebraic manipulation, and recalling that one
has yt = u(At) at optimality, we have transformed the problem
(1)–(2)–(3) into the equivalent problem of maximization of
m
t=1
ft (νtu(At) − cAt)
over the non-negative monotone polyhedron
Am ≥ Am−1 ≥ · · · A1 ≥ 0,
(recall that u is strictly increasing). To see the transformation of the


































Hence, dividing andmultiplying each term by ft we get the desired
expression.
Now, since the above problem is separable in t , and each term
is either a (strictly) concave function of At for when νt ≥ 0 or
(strictly) convex when νt ≤ 0, we ignore momentarily the mono-
tone non-negativity restriction. Then the result follows by calculus
and invoking the monotonicity assumption on ν(t) as follows. The
first-order condition
νtu′(At) − c = 0,
which is necessary and sufficient when the associated term is con-
cave, leads to the candidate optimal point for the unconstrained
3 Rewrite the inequalities for incentive compatibility as
pt − ps ≤ wts, ∀t, s ∈ T (6)
where wts = t(yt − ys). For fixed yt ’s, one may associate a network with the above
constraints. Each type is a node; for each pair (t, s) we make an arc from node t to
node s with length wst . Then the system of inequalities (6) is feasible if and only if
the network contains no negative length cycles by Corollary 3.4.2 of Vohra (2011).
Then add the inequalities corresponding to the cycle t → t + 1 → t:
pt − pt+1 ≤ t(yt − yt+1),
pt+1 − pt ≤ (t + 1)(yt+1 − yt )
to see that yt is monotone if the system (6) is feasible. That this monotonicity







if νt > 0
0 if νt ≤ 0.
The above is a non-negativemonotone solution as a result ofmono-
tonicity of ν and assumptions imposed on u. 
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∗, . . . ,m − 1







≤ (t + 1)
c
νt
, ∀ t = t∗, . . . ,m − 1.






, ∀ t = t∗, . . . ,m − 2 (7)
one can conclude that the average price per unit decreases with
the quantity A. In this case, one can implement the optimal non-
linear payment schedule by offering a menu of two-part tariffs as
discussed in Section 3.5 of Tirole (1990). In a recent paper Bagh and
Bhargava (2013) study the efficiency of two and three-part tariffs
and show that a relatively small menu of three-part tariffs may be
more profitable than a menu of two-part tariffs of any size.
In Section 2.3.1 of Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) the solution
of the above problem is investigated under the so-called Spence-
Mirrlees single crossing condition on the utility function u, which
helps simplify the problem by reducing the number of constraints
considerably. The simplification consists in replacing the large
number of ‘‘global’’ IC constraints by ‘‘local’’ (consecutive types) IC
constraints and making sure that a solution thus obtained would
satisfy all IC constraints; see Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Gues-
nerie and Seade (1982),Matthews andMoore (1987),Moore (1984)
andWilson (1997) for relatedwork. On the other hand, the reduced
problem is still non-convex. Hence, the KKT conditions are only
necessary provided that a suitable constraint qualification holds.
In fact, the KKT conditions are not solved in Bolton and Dewa-
tripont (2004). It is shown that the optimal mechanism results in
efficient consumption, i.e., t · u′(At) = c only for the highest type
t = mwhile t · u′(At) > c for all other types t , i.e., they all under-
consume. Our result also possesses this property as t ·u′(At) = t cνt
and νm = m while νt < t for all other t .
Example 1. Consider an example with m = 10 types, u(x) =
√
x,
c = 3.5, and
f = (0.1, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.10, 0.10, 0.08, 0.07, 0.04, 0.06)T .
Here, ν is monotone with the critical value t∗ = 4. The resulting
optimal direct mechanism is given byA∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0.020, 0.046,
0.250, 0.485, 0.881, 1.148, 2.041)T and p∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0.571,
0.929, 2.643, 4.018, 5.957, 7.151, 10.722)T . Here, the sufficient
condition (7) is satisfied. Hence we have declining price per unit
as quantity increases.
2.1. Convex production costs
When the cost of production function c is a strictly convex
function with c(0) = 0 and c ′(.) > 0, we can prove the following
immediately using the analysis of Proposition 1.
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c(.) (satisfying c(0) = 0 and c ′(.) > 0), there exists an optimal direct




and the optimal prices






for all t = t∗, . . . , T where t∗ is the smallest value of t that satisfies:
ν(t∗) > 0, and A∗t = p
∗
t = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , t
∗
− 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 with the
necessary changes. Therefore, we omit it. 
Example 2. Using the data of Example 1with c(x) = 2x2 weobtain




2/3, for t =
4, . . . , 10.We getA∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0.25, 0.327, 0.577, 0.719, 0.876,
0.958, 1.16)T and p∗ = (0, 0, 0, 2.002, 2.36, 3.484, 4.105, 4.809,
5.195, 6.174)T . Note that with a convex quadratic production cost,
the optimal mechanism tends to give allocations and prices that
are closer to one another for consecutive types in comparison to
the linear cost case.
3. The optimal mechanism under relaxed monotonicity
The above result in Proposition 1 and its proof break downwhen
f is not regular. However, one may still find explicitly the optimal
direct mechanism in sufficiently regular cases using the machin-
ery of the previous section. While all such cases are too numerous
to treat here, we prove some typical results in this direction which
convey the main ideas but keep the exposition relatively simple.
We define f to be 2 + regular if there exists t∗ ∈ T and non-
negative integer ℓ (could be equal to zero) such that
1. νt < 0 for t = 1, . . . , t∗ − 1
2. νt∗ > 0
3. νt∗+ℓ ≥ νt∗+ℓ+1
4. νt∗ < · · · < νt∗+ℓ−1 < νt∗+ℓ+2 < · · · < νm.
5. νt∗+ℓ−1(ft∗+ℓ + ft∗+ℓ+1) ≤ νt∗+ℓft∗+ℓ + νt∗+ℓ+1ft∗+ℓ+1.
Notice that when f is 2 + regular, the monotonicity of the positive
elements of the sequence ν is only violated by a single component,
νt∗+ℓ, or, equivalently, by a subsequence of length equal to 2.
Proposition 3. For f 2 + regular, and linear production cost c, there
exists an optimal mechanism with the optimal allocations A∗i = 0 for







∀i = {t∗, . . . , t∗ + ℓ − 1}





νt∗ ft∗+ℓ + νt∗+ℓ+1ft∗+1

i = t∗ + ℓ, t∗ + ℓ + 1,
and the optimal prices






for all t = t∗, . . . ,m, and p∗t = 0 for all others.






ft (νtu(At) − cAt)subject to
Am ≥ Am−1 ≥ · · · A1 ≥ 0,
since the proof does not depend on the regularity of f up to
that point. However, we can no longer ignore the monotone non-
negativity constraints and treat the problem as unconstrained as
that method worked due to monotonicity of ν. The problem is un-
fortunately non-convex due to a sum of convex and concave terms
in the objective function. Hence, a direct treatment using optimal-
ity conditions is futile. Instead, we shall proceed by examining a
‘‘split relaxation’’ of the problem. I.e., we shall separate the prob-
lem into two sub-problems, one for the negative νt and the other
for the positive νt . To avoid unnecessarily complicated notationwe
do the proof for the case ℓ = 0. It is a simple exercise to repeat the
proof for arbitrary positive integer ℓ. Hence we consider the fol-





ft (νtu(At) − cAt)
subject to






ft (νtu(At) − cAt)
subject to
Am ≥ Am−1 ≥ · · · At∗ ≥ 0.
Now, problem P1, which is a strictly convex maximization prob-
lem, is trivially solved by takingAt = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , t∗−1. For
problem P2, we write the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (they
are necessary and sufficient in P2 since the objective function is
strictly concave and we have linear constraints) after attaching
non-negative multipliers Υi to each constraint Ai − Ai−1 ≥ 0, for
i = t∗ + 1, . . . ,m and At∗ ≥ 0. Namely, we have the first-order
conditions (FOC)
fi(νiu′(Ai) − c) − Υi+1 + Υi = 0, ∀i = t∗, . . . ,m − 1,
fi(νmu′(Am) − c) + Υm = 0,
and complementarity conditions (CC)
Υi(Ai − Ai−1) = 0 ∀i = t∗ + 1, . . . ,m
Υt∗At∗ = 0.






and yi = 0 satisfies the corresponding equations
as well as the associated CC by virtue of the 2 + regularity of f and
assumptions imposed on u. For i = t∗, t∗+1we takeAt∗ = At∗+1,
yt∗ = 0 and solve the 2 × 2 system of linear equations for u′(At∗)
which gives after elimination of yt∗+1:
u′(At∗) =
c(ft∗ + ft∗+1)
νt∗ ft∗ + νt∗+1ft∗+1
and we take
yt∗+1 = ft∗νt∗u(At∗) − ft∗c. (9)
The resulting allocations are monotone by virtue of condition 5 on
f . We also have
yt∗+1 = −ft∗+1νt∗+1u(At∗) = ft∗+1c.
This equation with (9) imply that yt+1 > 0. Thus the above con-
struction gives an optimal solution to P2. Now, we can concatenate
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lution for the original problem. Since we obtained a feasible solu-
tion to the original problem by solving a relaxation, we have solved
the original problem optimally. 
Notice that the bunching(pooling) behavior observed in the con-
tinuous case occurs also here for types t∗ + ℓ and t∗ + ℓ + 1.
Example 3. Consider another example withm = 10 types, u(x) =√
x, c = 3, and
f = (0.0832, 0.0099, 0.1801, 0.1885, 0.0979, 0.0976,
0.0674, 0.1796, 0.0737, 0.0222)T .
Here, f is 2 + regular with the critical value t∗ = 4, and ℓ = 0,
i.e., we have
ν = (−10.01, −84.84, −1.03, 1.14, 0.50, 2.49,
2.91, 7.47, 8.69, 10.00)T .
The resulting optimal direct mechanism is given by A∗ = (0, 0, 0,
0.024, 0.024, 0.172, 0.236, 1.549, 2.103, 2.779)T and p∗ = (0, 0,
0, 0.616, 0.616, 2.179, 2.675, 8.747, 10.596, 12.765)T .
Such examples can be repeated as we move the location of the
monotonicity violating entry t∗ + ℓ + 1 in ν.
Example 4. Consider again an example with ten types. With
f = (0.25, 0.05, 0.25, 0.15, 0.05, 0.06, 0.07, 0.07, 0.02, 0.03)T ,
c = 2 and u(x) =
√
xwe have an f that is 2 + regular with t∗ = 3,
ℓ = 1 and
ν = (−2, −12, 1.2, 2, 0, 2.83, 5.28, 7.28, 7.5, 10.00)T .
From Proposition 3, the optimal allocation is obtained as
A∗ =(0, 0, 0.09, 0.141, 0.141,0.502,1.746,3.318,3.516, 6.250)T .
Amore relaxed regularity definition is the following: we define
f to be n+ regular if there exists t∗, ℓ ∈ T and integer n < m− t∗
such that
1. νt < 0 for t = 1, . . . , t∗ − 1
2. νt∗ > 0
3. νt∗+ℓ ≥ νt∗+ℓ+1 ≥ · · · ≥ νt∗+ℓ+n−1 ≥ 0






Here, there is a subsequence νt∗+ℓ ≥ νt∗+ℓ+1 ≥ · · · ≥ νt∗+ℓ+n−1 ≥
0 breaking the monotone increasing property of the positive com-
ponents of ν. The following result can be proved similarly to Propo-
sition 3.
Proposition 4. For f n+ regular, and linear production cost c, there
exists an optimal mechanism with the optimal allocations A∗i = 0 for






∀i = {t∗, . . . , t∗ + ℓ − 1}














for i = t∗ + ℓ, . . . , t∗ + ℓ + n − 1, and the optimal prices






for all t = t∗, . . . ,m, and p∗t = 0 for all others.
Example 5. Consider a modification of the previous example with
ten types. With
f = (0.25, 0.05, 0.25, 0.15, 0.07, 0.04, 0.07, 0.07, 0.02, 0.03)T ,
c = 2 and u(x) =
√
xwe have an f that is n+ regular with t∗ = 3,
ℓ = 1 and n = 3 and
ν = (−2, −12, 1.2, 2, 1.714, 1.25, 5.28, 7.28, 7.5, 10.00)T .
From Proposition 4, the optimal allocation is obtained as
A∗ =(0, 0, 0.09,0.204,0.204,0.204,1.746,3.318,3.516,6.25)T .
It is certainly possible that there exist several decreasing sub-
sequences violating monotonicity of the positive part of the ν vec-
tor. In such cases, pooling in the optimal mechanism will occur
in all such sequences. A general result is quite messy to state in
such cases. So, we refrain from it. One can invoke the procedure
outlined in Proposition 4 repeatedly, first isolating the decreasing
sub-sequences, dealing with the increasing subsequence first, and
implement a pooling procedure for each decreasing sub-sequence.
4. Non-separated (arbitrary) distributions
Up to this point we have implicitly assumed that the negative
and positive values of ν are separated in our relaxed definitions of
regularity. I.e., for all t ≥ t∗ we have νt ≥ 0. However, this as-
sumption may fail to hold as the following example shows.
Example 6. Consider an example with ten types. With
f = (0.25, 0.05, 0.25, 0.05, 0.10, 0.10, 0.08, 0.07, 0.02, 0.03)T ,
c = 2 and u(x) =
√
x we have an f that is not n + regular with a
non-separated
ν = (−2, −12, 1.2, −4, 2, 4, 5.5, 7.28, 7.5, 10.00)T .
The optimal allocation is obtained as
A∗ = (0, 0, 0.007, 0.007, 0.250, 0.998, 1.883,
3.314, 3.507, 6.245)T .
We shall now see how this optimal allocation is obtained from a
closed-form formula as in the previous results.
The difficulty with non-separated ν is that the proof of Propo-
sition 3 (or Proposition 4) fails to go through although the result
remains true under a slight additional assumption.
We define f to be 2-regular if there exists t∗ ∈ T and non-
negative integer ℓ (could be equal to zero) such that
1. νt < 0 for t = 1, . . . , t∗ − 1
2. νt∗ > 0
3. νt∗+ℓ ≥ νt∗+ℓ+1 with νt∗+ℓ+1 < 0 and νt∗+ℓ ≥ 0
4. νt∗ < · · · < νt∗+ℓ−1 < νt∗+ℓ+2 < · · · < νm
5. ft∗+ℓνt∗+ℓ + ft∗+ℓ+1νt∗+ℓ+1 > 0.
Notice that the probability mass f of Example 6 is 2-regular.
Proposition 5. For f 2-regular, and linear production cost c, there
exists an optimal mechanism with the optimal allocations A∗i = 0 for







∀i = {t∗, . . . , t∗ + ℓ − 1}
∪ {t∗ + ℓ + 2, . . . ,m},




νt∗ ft∗+ℓ + νt∗+ℓ+1ft∗+1

i = t∗ + ℓ, t∗ + ℓ + 1,
and the optimal prices






for all t = t∗, . . . ,m, and p∗t = 0 for all others.
Proof. Wemay consider a split relaxation of the problem as in the
proof of Proposition 3.Wemay define and treat P1 as before. How-
ever, there is an added difficulty with P2 in that the objective func-
tion of P2 is no longer necessarily concave due to the presence of a
negative coefficient νt∗+ℓ+1 after a positive coefficient νt∗+ℓ. There-
fore, we shall proceed in a different manner. Ignoring momentar-
ily the monotonicity constraints on At , t = t∗, . . . ,mwe observe
that the function ft∗+ℓ+1(νt∗+ℓ+1u(At∗+ℓ+1)− cAt∗+ℓ+1) is strictly
convex, and therefore would be maximized at At∗+ℓ+1 = 0 (re-
call that allocation variables are restricted to be non-negative). This
implies that the monotonicity constraint At∗+ℓ+1 ≥ At∗+ℓ will
bind at optimality. Now, isolating the portion of the problem corre-
sponding toAt∗+ℓ+1, At∗+ℓ and ignoringmonotonicity restrictions
we have the lower negative νt part (the left sub-problem) where
we have the identically zero allocation as in the proof of Proposi-






for t = t∗ + ℓ + 1, . . . ,m. Now, for the prob-
lem in two variables corresponding to At∗+ℓ+1, At∗+ℓ, we use the
binding property and reduce the problem to maximization of only
g(At∗+ℓ) ≡ ft∗+ℓ(νt∗+ℓu(At∗+ℓ) − cAt∗+ℓ)
+ ft∗+ℓ+1(νt∗+ℓ+1u(At∗+ℓ) − cAt∗+ℓ)
which is strictly concave (by property 5. of 2-regular f ) and maxi-




which is positive by our assumption on f and satisfies monotonic-
ity when concatenated with the right sub-problem. Therefore, we
have constructed a monotone solution to the original problem
splitting the problem objective function into three parts and solv-
ing each piece ignoring the monotonicity restriction in the two
sub-problems left and right, and pooling in the middle part. 
Our argumentation in the proof of Proposition 5 implies that all
types with a negative νt tend to receive an allocation as small as
possible, i.e., either zero, or a value dictated by pooling/bunching
where the allocation is decided by some lower type to the left.
There are situations where Proposition 5 can be extended in
a straightforward fashion. One such extension concerns the case
when the decreasing subsequence breaking the monotonicity in
Proposition 5 can have more than 2 elements, say q elements. In
this case, condition 5 should be modified as
Condition 5b.
q−1
j=0 ft∗+ℓ+jνt∗+ℓ+j > 0.














i = t∗ + ℓ, . . . , t∗ + ℓ + q − 1. (10)
It may also occur that the first decreasing sub-sequence occurs
right after the initial negative portion of the vector ν (cf. Example 7
below). In that case, if condition 5 above fails, then one can imme-
diately make null assignment for these types.In general with arbitrary f one can expect several decreasing
sub-sequences in ν with possibly negative entries. In such cases,
one should treat separately each such sub-sequence for possible
pooling. However, one should be careful in that a sub-sequence
(with or without negative elements) may fail to satisfy condition
5 above in the definition of 2-regularity (2 + regularity or n +
regularity, respectively). In that case onemay have to pool together
two consecutive such sub-sequences (or pool with a previous
monotone increasing sub-sequence) based on repeated application
of Propositions 3–5, and illustrated with examples. I.e., each de-
creasing sub-sequence which fails to receive an allocation on its
own will be a candidate for pooling with a previous sub-sequence,
be it a decreasing or an increasing sub-sequence.
Example 7. Consider an example with m = 20 types, u(x) =
√
x,
c = 3, and
f = (0.020, 0.080, 0.052, 0.017, 0.038, 0.067, 0.021, 0.082,
0.027, 0.102, 0.030, 0.085, 0.021, 0.032, 0.010, 0.064,
0.076, 0.060, 0.047, 0.071)T .
Here, we have
ν = (−49.282, −9.287, −13.189, −45.195, −16.053, −4.811,
−26.269, 0.367, −13.182, 5.121, −4.617, 7.505, −4.215,
3.686, −16.475, 12.009, 14.638, 16.048, 17.493, 20.00)T .
Here t∗ = 8. The resulting optimal direct mechanism is given by
optimal allocations A∗t = 0, for t = 1, . . . , 9 and
(0.235, 0.235, 0.316, 0.316, 0.316,
0.316, 4.004, 5.949, 7.161, 8.508, 11.122)T
for t = 11, . . . , 20. The particularity of this example is that while
we notice four monotonicity breaking sub-sequences with nega-
tive νt ’s, namely the pairs indexed s0 = (8, 9), s1 = (10, 11), s2 =
(12, 13) and s3 = (14, 15), pooling occurs for (8, 9), and (10, 11)
separately whereas (12, 13, 14, 15) are pooled as a single sub-
sequence. The reason for zero allocation to (8, 9) is that f8ν8 + f9ν9
< 0, i.e., condition 5 fails andwemake a zero allocation for types (8,
9) since it is the first such sub-sequence after the left sub-problem.
We move next to s1, condition 5 holds and we make the allocation
assignment equal to 0.235 for both 10 and 11.Wemove to s2 where
condition 5 holds and we check condition 5 for s3 where it fails.
Then we make a single subsequence (12, 13, 14, 15) where now
condition 5b holds. Then we make the allocation equal to 0.316
using the equivalent of formula (10).
Example 8. Consider another example withm = 20 types, u(x) =√
x, c = 3, and
f = (0.026, 0.030, 0.065, 0.028, 0.086, 0.103, 0.076, 0.036,
0.061, 0.011, 0.095, 0.092, 0.086, 0.027, 0.062, 0.002,
0.045, 0.033, 0.017, 0.019)T .
Here, we have
ν = (−36.023, −29.030, −10.602, −26.608, −3.860, −0.438,
−0.662, −7.261, 1.008, −32.212, 6.968, 8.846, 10.610,
7.505, 13.150, −30.958, 15.467, 16.914, 17.899, 20.00)T .
Here t∗ = 9. According to our results, the optimal direct mecha-
nism is given by optimal allocations A∗t = 0, for t = 1, . . . , 8 (the
lower sub-problem) and
(0, 0, 1.350, 2.174, 2.697, 2.697, 3.677,
3.677, 6.642, 7.951, 8.889, 11.119)T
for t = 9, . . . , 20, obtained as follows. The first decreasing sub-
sequence s0 = (9, 10) has a negative element ν10 and condition
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. However, there is a decreasing sub-sequence follow-
ing it. That sub-sequence (13, 14) has positive elements only and
receives a pooling allocation according to Proposition 3. Therefore,
the allocation of (11, 12) can be finalized. Finally, s1 = (15, 16) is
another sub-sequencewith a negative element, passes condition 5,
and receives allocation according to Proposition 5. The solution of
the right sub-problem gives optimal allocations for the remaining
types.
5. Concluding remarks
In this brief paper, we examined the pricing problem of a risk-
neutral monopolist producing an infinitely divisible good at a cost
and offering the good to a single potential buyer with a non-linear
utility function and a private valuation for the good expressed as
a positive integer number. Under the usual assumption of regu-
larity of the type distribution, we gave a closed-form solution for
the pricing problem. Then by gradually relaxing the regularity as-
sumption, we showed how a complete solution can be obtained
analytically by means of a simple procedure in the absence of any
regularity in the type distribution. While a full-fledged application
as in Crawford and Shum (2007) is beyond the scope of this paper,
it will be interesting to test the results of the paper on a suitable
economic application in the future.
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